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ABSTRACT
Thirty years ago, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court determined that
excessive-force claims against police should proceed via the Fourth
Amendment, which theoretically protects an individual against unreasonable
siezures. However, the Court showed extreme deference to law enforcement’s
use of force by using a permissive reasonableness analysis that bestows on
police great leeway to make quick split-second decisions in tense and rapidly
evolving circumstances. The result is a test that, from its inception, has been too
forgiving of police violence and misconduct. This lax reasonableness standard,
along with qualified immunity principles, has shielded police from § 1983 civil
rights litigation in excessive-force cases. However, the obstacles to relief are
worse when the victim is not an individual in a regular street encounter but
rather an activist during a protest—particularly an activist of color.
This Essay explores this phenomenon through the lens of the Dundon v.
Kirchmeier litigation that stemmed from the 2016 police assault on indigenous
protestors opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline. The encounter left 200 activists
injured after law enforcement blasted them overnight with tear gas, special
impact munitions, and fire hoses to remove them from the area. In refusing to
enjoin the police’s use of these weapons against water protectors, the judge
questioned whether the Fourth Amendment even protected activists since police
sought to disperse them, instead of arrest them. The judge then reasoned that
even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the police use of force was reasonable
considering the volatility of the crowd despite information that the plaintiffs
themselves were peaceful—thus attributing the conduct of the entire group to
the plaintiffs and erroneously amplifying the threat to law enforcement. Both
lines of reasoning threaten the safety of protestors. The first removes from
Fourth Amendment protection the emblematic protest scenario where police use
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force to disperse protestors. The second turns the Constitution on its head,
foregoing traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which inquires whether the
government intrusion is reasonable in light of the individual’s actions, not the
actions of the whole group in proximity to the individual. This is most dangerous
to activists of color who are most likely to be perceived as threatening by police
and to be the subject of their ire.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2016, members of the Oceti Šakowiŋ tribe and others stood
on top of the Backwater Bridge together in prayer and protest in opposition to
the construction of a 1172-mile-long pipeline that would transfer fuel from
North Dakota to Illinois.1 The water protectors2 opposed the pipeline for both
spiritual and environmental reasons.3 They were unarmed.4 Still, police
descended upon the activists like a military unit—aboard armored vehicles and
fully loaded with special impact munitions,5 tear gas, water cannons, and fire
hoses—to clear them from the area.6 In the evening and early morning, law
enforcement blasted activists with weapons and sprayed them with water for
several hours in freezing temperatures. 7 At the conclusion of this assault, more
than two hundred water protectors were injured,8 including twenty-six who
required hospitalization.9 Injuries ranged from loss of vision and broken bones
to hypothermia.10
This aggression was not aberrational or unique to indigenous protests of the
Dakota Access Pipeline (“DAPL”). Just in the last five years, a sampling of
protests by activists of color outraged by police killings of black men in
Baltimore, Baton Rouge, and Ferguson prompted similarly violent, excessive,

1

First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages & Injunctive &
Declaratory Relief at 2, 7-8, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27,
2018) [hereinafter Dundon Amended Complaint].
2
Activists termed themselves “water protectors” instead of protesters. See Iyuskin
American Horse, ‘We Are Protectors, Not Protesters’: Why I’m Fighting the North Dakota
Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016, 11:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/aug/18/north-dakota-pipeline-activists-bakken-oil-fields [https://perma.cc
/5UM3-NZNV]; see also Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
3
Lauren Donovan, Sioux Spirit Camp to Protest Dakota Access Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB.
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/sioux-spirit-camp-toprotest-dakota-access-pipeline/article_4773fba1-f3bb-599d-96a4-7d1ddf30690e.html.
4
Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
5
See Dave Young, Definition and Explanation of Less-Lethal, POLICEONE.COM (Nov. 28,
2004), https://www.policeone.com/corrections-training/articles/94021-Definition-andexplanation-of-less-lethal/ [https://perma.cc/7W58-EPBE].
6
Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2, 14.
7
Id. at 3, 14-15, 38.
8
Id. at 3. One police officer also reported a minor injury. Id. at 15.
9
Julia Carrie Wong, Dakota Access Pipeline: 300 Protesters Injured After Police Use
Water Cannons, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/nov/21/dakota-access-pipeline-water-cannon-police-standing-rock-protest
[https://perma.cc/G5FE-23HD].
10
Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 16, 22-24, 26-28, 30 (alleging plaintiffs
suffered head wounds, concussions, lasting pain, difficulty walking, chemical burns, and
broken bones).
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and militaristic law enforcement responses.11 Protests by whites are treated
differently. For example, one may recall the restrained law enforcement
response to white, antigovernment militiamen who seized federal lands and
property in Nevada and Oregon.12 This disparate treatment is unfortunately in
line with abusive and brutal policing in minority communities and with law
enforcement officers’ predisposition to view people of color—and consequently
activists of color—as threatening or dangerous.13 It is also nothing new. The
American “system of free speech” has historically treated activists of color with
hostility.14 “In the 1960s, minorities sat in, were arrested and
convicted[,] . . . demonstrated, sang ‘We Shall Overcome,’ and were arrested
and convicted.”15 In his last speech before his assassination, Dr. Martin Luther

11
See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DOJ, AFTER-ACTION
ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON,
MISSOURI, at xvi, 53-60 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.police
foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/After-Action-Assessment-of-the-PoliceResponse-to-the-August-2014-Demonstrations-in-Ferguson-Missouri.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DLV7-WZPF] (assessing police response in Ferguson and identifying themes that
“permeated all aspects of the police response”); Conor Friedersdorf, Police Face Civilian
Protesters—Dressed for Military Combat, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.the
atlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/ferguson-police-face-civil-rights-protest-dressed-formilitary-combat/375962/ (describing photograph of armed police in camouflage uniforms in
Ferguson “squaring off against a nonviolent protestor in a t-shirt and jeans with both of his
hands raised over his head”); Maya Lau, Helping or Hurting? Police Deploy Military-Style
Gear at Alton Sterling Protests in Baton Rouge, THE ADVOCATE (July 11, 2016, 8:50 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_5b4c6f61-632a-5824-b27138b2e2eda7ae.html [https://perma.cc/B7UJ-6MM8]; Collier Meyerson, Protesters Against
Police Violence Risk the Very Thing They’re Fighting, THE NATION (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/protesters-against-police-violence-risk-the-very-thingtheyre-fighting/ (describing trauma caused by police response in Baton Rouge).
12
See RYAN LENZ & MARK POTOK, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., WAR IN THE WEST: THE BUNDY
RANCH STANDOFF AND THE AMERICAN RADICAL RIGHT 5, 9-11 (Heidi Beirich ed., 2014),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/war_in_
the_west_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W8B-FP8N] (describing how officers withdrew
without engaging in violence); Jennifer Williams, The Oregon Militia Standoff, Explained,
VOX (Jan. 26, 2016, 10:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/3/10703712/oregon-militiastandoff [https://perma.cc/7DHX-F4SB] (describing response to militia seizure of federal
wildlife refuge in Oregon); see also Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of
Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 YALE L.J.F. 685, 707-08 (2018).
13
See LESLEY J. WOOD, CRISIS AND CONTROL: THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTEST POLICING
41-42 (2014) (“Police and intelligence agents are much more likely to label protesters from
poor or racially marginalized communities, ideologically oriented protesters, and youthful
protesters [as uncooperative or threatening].”).
14
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 207,
221 (2004).
15
Id. at 207.
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King Jr. recalled confronting police water hoses and dogs in Birmingham,
Alabama:
And we just went on before the dogs and we would look at them; and we’d
go on before the water hoses and we would look at it, and we’d just go on
singing “Over my head I see freedom in the air.” And then we would be
thrown in the paddy wagons . . . .16
The pervasive problem of violent protest policing of activists of color has the
same root causes as generalized police violence in communities of color and
deserves similar attention. It is a vital line of inquiry for critical race theorists.
The right to express dissent unhampered by the fear of police retribution and
violence, like the right to walk the streets unharmed by the government, is an
element of equal membership in a democracy. It is not the right of a privileged
group. However, the freedom to complain and express opposition is elusive for
activists of color, and courts unfortunately reinforce this condition through their
treatment of mass protests. As Dr. King noted wistfully in that same last speech,
But somewhere I read of the freedom of assembly. Somewhere I read of
the freedom of speech.
Somewhere I read of the freedom of press. Somewhere I read that the
greatness of America is the right to protest for right. And so just as I say,
we aren’t going to let dogs or water hoses turn us around . . . . We are going
on.17
Nevertheless, minority protesters and their allies are still the more likely victims
of militarized and violent protest policing. Such was the case at the Backwater
Bridge in North Dakota.
The confrontation on Backwater Bridge is the subject of the Dundon v.
Kirchmeier18 class action lawsuit. In their complaint, the plaintiffs—indigenous
water protectors—alleged that police used excessive force in contravention of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, chilled their First Amendment
expression, and violated their equal protection rights.19 Although the matter is
still pending, early in the case the district judge refused to enjoin police from
using these less-than-lethal weapons against water protectors, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.20 In ruling against the injunction on the police’s use of force,
the district judge began by querying how the Fourth Amendment may apply to

16
Martin Luther King Jr., Martin Luther King’s Final Speech: ‘I’ve Been to the
Mountaintop’—The Full Text, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013, 3:19 PM), https://abcnews.go.com
/Politics/martin-luther-kings-final-speech-ive-mountaintop-full/story?id=18872817
[https://perma.cc/4ZB4-LEVU].
17
Id.
18
Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
19
See id. at 38-39.
20
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *20 (D.N.D. Feb. 7,
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam).
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police action.21 This is because thirty years ago, in Graham v. Connor,22 the
Supreme Court determined that excessive-force claims should proceed via the
Fourth Amendment.23 This ruling has led to the evisceration of the
overwhelming majority of excessive-force claims in one-on-one civilian-police
encounters and to the evaluation of police brutality through a too-narrow and
individualistic lens.24 The district judge’s treatment of the Fourth Amendment
in Dundon led him to conclude that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on
the merits.25
The Dundon case demonstrates how claims of excessive police force during
protests are even more challenging for plaintiffs than when asserted during
regular street interactions between police and civilians. Part I of this Essay
describes the Graham case and the manner in which the cabining of excessiveforce analysis within the Fourth Amendment, together with qualified immunity
doctrine, acts as a nearly impenetrable bar to § 1983 litigation against police
officers generally. Part II demonstrates that, just like police are more likely to
violently target people of color in street encounters, law enforcement is more
likely to confront activists of color violently. Thus, the rights and safety of
people of color are particularly at risk during protests. Part III uses the district
court opinion denying an injunction in Dundon to show how Graham interacts
with other Fourth Amendment doctrine to make matters worse for individuals
seeking relief from police-excessive-force cases in the emblematic protest
scenario where force is used to disperse activists rather than to detain them.

21

Id. at *18-19.
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
23
Id. at 388 (holding that excessive-force claims are “properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due
process standard”).
24
See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L.
REV. 211, 216 (2017) (“[I]ll-considered statements in Graham and other decisions reinforce
a ‘split-second’ theory of policing that sets the wrong constitutional floor.”); Osagie K.
Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police
Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 NW.
U. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (2018) (“The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted post-Graham, simply
operates at the wrong level; its individualist nature cannot address a fundamentally structural
problem.”).
25
Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *19 (finding that no reasonable juror could conclude
that force used by police at Backwater Bridge was “objectively unreasonable”). Chief Judge
Hovland further denied the injunction based on the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim,
stating that the police conduct did not “shock[] the conscience.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Spain,
209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000)). The judge also ruled that the plaintiffs were trespassing
on property closed to the public and therefore had no right to engage in First Amendment
activity. Id. at *20. In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs later highlighted that they were
situated in a location open to the public. Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 12.
The judge further ruled that any equal protection claim was dependent on the outcome of the
excessive-force and First Amendment claims. Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *16.
22
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GRAHAM AND LIMITS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
ON POLICE-EXCESSIVE-FORCE CASES

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor considered
the manner in which excessive-force claims against police should proceed.26
Before Graham, lower courts were split as to what legal standard to apply to a
claim of police excessive force in interactions with civilians during investigatory
stops or arrests. The majority of courts applied Fourteenth Amendment due
process, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the officer had subjective
malicious intent, while other courts applied the Fourth Amendment and required
plaintiffs to show that the officer’s conduct failed to meet the “objective
reasonableness” standard.27
The facts of Graham were as follows: Mr. Dethorne Graham, a black man,28
was in the midst of a diabetic crisis and was searching for orange juice when
police officers observed him enter and quickly leave a convenience store, get
into his friend’s car, and drive away.29 With no additional information, Charlotte
Police Officer M.S. Connor stopped the car and, despite explanations from both
the driver and Mr. Graham that the latter was having a diabetic reaction, ordered
them both to wait while he investigated what had occurred at the store.30 Mr.
Graham then exited the car and ran around it twice. He then sat on the sidewalk
and began talking to his friend, the driver.31 Additional police arrived in response
to Connor’s request for backup. Ignoring the driver’s pleas for candy or juice for
his friend, police pushed the driver aside, rolled Mr. Graham on his belly, and
handcuffed his hands behind his back.32 At some point, Mr. Graham passed out.
He regained consciousness after officers lifted him and placed him face down
on the hood of the police car.33 Officers told Mr. Graham to “shut up” and pushed
his face against the car when he asked them to look in his wallet for his diabetic
card. The officers then threw Mr. Graham “headfirst into the police car” and
refused to allow him to have the juice his friend brought to the car.34 Finally, the
officers heard back that there was no incident at the store, drove Mr. Graham

26

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
Id. at 392-93.
28
Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (No. 87-6571), 1988 WL 1025786,
at *3 [hereinafter Graham Petitioner Brief].
29
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-89.
30
Id. at 389.
31
Id.
32
Id. (reporting that one officer stated: “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that
never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M. F. but drunk. Lock the S. B. up”).
33
Id.
34
Id.
27
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home, and released him.35 Mr. Graham sustained injuries as a result of the police
officers’ conduct, including a permanent ringing in his ear. 36
The civil rights lawsuit proceeded to trial in the District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina.37 Before a jury verdict, the district judge granted the
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of excessive force,
applying the existing test for substantive due process, which consisted of the
following factors:
(1) The need for the application for the force.
(2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was
used.
(3) The extent of the injury inflicted.
(4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.38
The judge ruled that the force was “appropriate under the circumstances,” the
victim was not injured, and the officer acted in good faith “to maintain or restore
order in the face of a potentially explosive situation” and not “maliciously or
sadistically.”39 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision using the
same due process analysis.40
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Graham argued that a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process analysis was inappropriate and that the
Fourth Amendment should be applied to the excessive-police-force claims. 41
Graham emphasized that the Fourth Amendment applied because he was clearly
seized by the police officers.42 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial
court’s decision, thereby settling the split among lower courts as to whether to
apply the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment. Reasoning that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures, the Court held that where
“the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop
of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.”43 The Court stated that “all claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under
35

Id.
Id. at 390 (noting that, in total, Graham claimed to have sustained broken foot, cuts on
wrists, bruises on forehead, injured shoulder, and ringing in right ear).
37
Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986), aff’d, 827 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 396 (1989).
38
Id. (citing King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1980)).
39
Id.
40
Graham, 490 U.S. at 391.
41
Graham Petitioner Brief, supra note 28, at 8.
42
Id. at 10.
43
Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 396.
36
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the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” 44 Relevant for later
discussion, the Graham Court defined a seizure, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,45 as
“when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of
authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”46 Although
Graham advocated for the application of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
defined “reasonableness” in a manner that was problematic for future
plaintiffs—including Mr. Graham, who lost in his post-remand trial. 47 In its
customary display of colorblindness, the Court failed to state Mr. Graham’s race.
In Graham, the Court defined the “calculus of reasonableness” in a manner
that immunizes aggressive police misconduct post-Graham and provides
excessive deference to law enforcement, who the Court bemoaned are “often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”48 The application of this version of
reasonableness to post-Graham excessive-force cases has left civilians with no
recourse against violent police conduct and arguably has allowed police to get
away with murder.49
There are two federal vehicles for either the government or individual
plaintiffs to seek remediation for violent police misconduct. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, the federal government—via the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)—can
prosecute a police officer who has violated an individual’s constitutional rights
“on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race.”50
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the Civil Rights Act—an individual plaintiff can
bring a civil lawsuit asserting that a police officer violated their constitutional
rights.51 For example, § 1983 was the vehicle for the lawsuit in Graham.52 In
view of Graham, courts have consistently cabined excessive-force analysis
within the Fourth Amendment in both § 242 cases and § 1983 cases.
In § 242 criminal prosecutions, despite the Graham language that the due
process test requirement of malicious intent “is incompatible with a proper
Fourth Amendment analysis,”53 the government must prove “evil motive”

44

Id. at 395.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
46
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19
n.16).
47
See id. at 396; Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV.
1182, 1207 (2017).
48
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
49
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A23.
50
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018).
51
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
52
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
53
Id. at 397.
45
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beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction.54 Specifically, the prosecutor must
show that the officer knew that their conduct was a violation of the victim’s
constitutional rights and that the officer committed the act for that purpose.55
Thus, scholars have asserted that Graham ultimately did nothing to dispel the
intent requirement for civil rights prosecutions.56 This is evidenced in the DOJ’s
decision not to prosecute Police Officer Darren Wilson, having concluded it
could not show that Officer Wilson acted willfully to violate Michael Brown’s
constitutional rights when he shot the teenager between six and eight times. 57
What’s more, even without this “evil motive” requirement, the DOJ would have
decided not to prosecute because it concluded, citing the deferential language of
Graham, that the “shots fired by Wilson were [not] objectively unreasonable.”58
Although Officer Wilson claimed that he mistakenly believed that Michael
Brown had a gun when he fired, the DOJ Report clearly states that even if Officer
Wilson knew that Brown was walking toward him unarmed and with his hands
up, Graham’s progeny establishes that the officer can shoot him and the officer’s

54
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (“An evil motive to accomplish that
which the statute condemns becomes a constituent element of the crime.”).
55
See id. (interpreting statutory requirement of “willful”); see also U.S. DOJ, REPORT
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN
85-86 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_
michael_brown_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ83-YUSA] (concluding that in Michael Brown
shooting, DOJ did not think it would have been able to prove willfulness beyond reasonable
doubt); Law Enforcement Misconduct, U.S. DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/crt/lawenforcement-misconduct [https://perma.cc/YNP2-KH69] (last updated Feb. 25, 2019)
(describing necessary steps for successful prosecution under statute).
56
See Jill I. Brown, Comment, Defining “Reasonable” Police Conduct: Graham v.
Connor and Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1991) (“When
courts require proof of subjective intent or significant injury, they effectively convert the
fourth amendment inquiry into a due process test, depriving civil rights plaintiffs of Graham’s
benefit.”).
57
DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT, supra note 55, at 11-12, 85-86. The DOJ investigations
into the police-involved deaths of Eric Garner and Freddie Gray reached the same conclusion
not to prosecute. See Bobby Allyn, NYPD Officer Will Not Face Federal Criminal Charges
in Eric Garner’s Death, NPR (July 16, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/16
/742186042/nypd-officer-wont-face-federal-criminal-charges-in-eric-garner-s-deathsources-s [https://perma.cc/24UU-HA2Y]; Alvin Bragg, Opinion, Eric Garner Is Proof That
We Need to Reform Laws on Excessive Force, WASH. POST (July 17, 2019, 5:55 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/17/eric-garner-is-proof-that-we-needreform-laws-excessive-force/; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. DOJ, Federal
Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-decline-prosecution-death-freddie-gray
[https://perma.cc/5VB2-V3NU].
58
DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT, supra note 55, at 7, 10, 85.
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actions must be deemed reasonable and not excessive.59 Essentially, the law will
excuse an officer’s use of deadly force in an interaction with a civilian as long
as the individual has not already surrendered.60 This result demonstrates how
inconsistent the Fourth Amendment analysis under § 242 is with any manner in
which individuals assess reasonableness in regular parlance.
Alternatively, § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is the vehicle for individual and
class action suits for excessive police force.61 However, Graham, together with
qualified immunity principles, has blunted the utility of § 1983 actions to
counteract excessive police force. In addition to the Court’s lax
“reasonableness” standard, qualified immunity allows a police officer to avoid
liability unless they know that their action is unlawful before acting. The
qualified immunity doctrine has developed such that police officers can avoid
suit unless the plaintiff can point to a preceding case in which a police officer
acted in a factually analogous manner and the court found that his conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment.62 Otherwise, the lawsuit will be dismissed. This
barrier from suit not only shields the police officer but also prevents the law
from developing further. As a result, courts will rarely have to grapple with the
question of whether a police officer’s conduct was unconstitutional. This may
be why representatives of decedents in police-killing cases routinely sue via
wrongful death instead of § 1983.63 The families of Michael Brown, Eric Garner,
and Freddie Gray obtained recovery via settlement of their wrongful death
actions.64

59
Id. (finding sufficient evidence that Wilson reasonably believed that Brown posed
deadly threat, and that use of deadly force was therefore not unreasonable).
60
Id. at 12, 84-85 (citing Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 966 (8th Cir. 2012)
(finding officer’s use of deadly force was not unreasonable even where victim’s arms were
above his head and he was slowly advancing toward the officer)).
61
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
62
See Karen J. Pita Loor, When Protest Is the Disaster: Constitutional Implications of
State and Local Emergency Power, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2019); see also Avidan Y.
Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1789 (2016)
(describing how qualified immunity “stagnat[es] constitutional development”); Diana Hassel,
Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 124-29 (2009) (discussing how courts merge
Fourth Amendment inquiry and qualified immunity question in excessive-force cases); Tahir
Duckett, Note, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amendment
Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 411 (2016) (evaluating “intersection of
the reasonableness inquiry at the center of Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, and
the reasonable person standard of the qualified immunity defense”).
63
See Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559,
561 (1985).
64
David Carson, Michael Brown’s Family Received $1.5 Million Settlement with
Ferguson, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline
/michael-brown-shooting/michael-brown-s-family-received-1-5-million-settlementferguson-n775936 [https://perma.cc/HT26-HLPS]; Julia Marsh, City Approves $4M Payment
to Eric Garner’s Family, N.Y. POST (Aug. 2, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/08/02
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Despite the preceding discussion’s focus on tragic police killings of African
Americans, it is vital to note that black men are not the only people of color who
are the persistent victims of police violence. Latinx people likewise die at the
hands of police at an alarming rate,65 and law enforcement kill indigenous
peoples at a higher rate than any other group.66 Furthermore, while the most
serious cases of police brutality lead to certain death for some civilians, for
others—particularly people of color—violent police interactions can cause a
dignitary “death by a thousand cuts.” Victims of these violent police encounters
likewise find no solace in § 1983 actions and have no cause of action for
wrongful death. Scholars have indicted Graham on various fronts: how its “split
second” language focuses courts on the exact moment of violence and ignores
how police could have been trained to de-escalate instead of escalate violence, 67
how it interacts with qualified immunity to shield violent and dangerous police
misconduct from court oversight,68 and how it facilitates courts ignoring and
overlooking the race of victims and perpetrators of police violence. 69

/city-approves-4m-payment-to-eric-garners-family/ [https://perma.cc/48NY-JG7C]; Yvonne
Wenger & Mark Puente, Baltimore to Pay Freddie Gray’s Family $6.4 Million to Settle Civil
Claims, BALT. SUN (Sept. 8, 2015, 10:01 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bsmd-ci-boe-20150908-story.html.
65
Kenya Downs, Why Aren’t More People Talking About Latinos Killed by Police?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (July 14, 2016, 1:21 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/black-menwerent-unarmed-people-killed-police-last-week [https://perma.cc/M22F-TTJ4] (noting that
Latinos made up 16% of police killings in 2016).
66
Stephanie Woodard, The Police Killings No One Is Talking About, IN THESE TIMES (Oct.
17, 2016), https://inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_killings_native_lives_
matter.html [https://perma.cc/SC8X-EYNA].
67
See, e.g., Cover, supra note 62, at 1823 (arguing that generic due process right against
excessive force could “help guard against pardoning biases . . . that may infect police
behavior as products of ‘split-second judgments’”); Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 24, at
223-24 (arguing that Garner reasonableness test fails to address “totality of the
circumstances” because it does not take into account officer preparation, training, or tactics
prior to use of force).
68
See, e.g., Cover, supra note 62, at 1784-87; Hassel, supra note 62, at 124-29; Duckett,
supra note 62, at 424-25.
69
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1486, 1489 n.41, 1500 (2016) (describing racialized “broken
windows” policing and pretextual stops that go unchecked by courts); Christian M.
Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical Decision-Making in the Context of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 319, 332-35 (2011) (addressing
“negative association” with people of color that lead police to assume “heightened propensity
for violence and criminality in black men” that courts do not consider in reasonableness
calculation); Obasogie & Newman, supra note 24, at 1470 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is an
area of constitutional law that is structurally unsuited to address racialized group harm—an
evaluation that is necessary for understanding the nature of police violence today.”).
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ACTIVISTS OF COLOR ARE THE MORE LIKELY VICTIMS
OF VIOLENCE IN PROTEST POLICING

Graham, as previously discussed, excuses police violence through a
permissive reasonableness test. As will be discussed in Part III, Graham
coalesces with other Fourth Amendment doctrine to make matters worse for
victims of violent and militaristic protest policing. This is of particular import to
activists of color whose protest activities are more likely to be targets of
excessive police attention and force. It aggregates with the high policing and
surveillance in communities of color to create or aggravate racialized police
violence.70
Legal scholars have given well-deserved attention to the unequal treatment
and targeting of people of color during regular policing.71 The manner in which
police engage aggressively with civilians of color as they walk the streets or
drive in their vehicles has been closely examined.72 How law enforcement
engages with protesters of color deserves similar attention and study in the legal
academy and among critical race scholars. Like in regular street encounters
between police and individuals of color, the racial identity of protesters affects
the police response.
Certain social scientists who have examined this problem naturally have
extrapolated from existing research demonstrating that police are more likely to
believe that people of color carry guns73 and behave violently or criminally.74 In
70

See Zach Newman, Note, “Hands up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal
Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 151-53 (2015).
71
See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 45-48 (1966) (discussing how implicit racial biases can lead to police
shorthand that signals potential danger based solely on race); I. Bennett Capers, Policing,
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 43-48 (2009) (discussing policing and race
as they relate to institutional housing segregation); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing:
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 208 (2007) (describing
difficulties that arise due to police assumption that “racial minorities are more likely to be
engaged in criminal behavior”).
72
Bennett Capers, supra note 71, at 60-62; see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF
THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY
FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 3-5
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/9HRL-RMEC]; Carbado, supra note 69, at 1486, 1489, 1500.
73
Anthony G. Greenwald, Mark A. Oakes & Hunter G. Hoffman, Targets of
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses of Weapons Holders, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL., Oct. 2003, at 399, 399-405 (analyzing “signal detection theory” as method of
evaluating racial biases in weapons holders).
74
See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY (1990); see also Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and
Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 380 (1997) (“[O]ne of the
most popular negative beliefs expressed about ‘most’ blacks is that they are ‘violent and
aggressive.’”).
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other words, police view people of color as more threatening in day-to-day
interactions. This research translates to how police perceive protesters of color
versus white protesters. Just like they do during routine policing, law
enforcement view people of color as more threatening and dangerous than
whites during protests.75 This translates to more vigilant and aggressive policing
of nonwhite protesters.
A study that examined over fifteen thousand American protests during a
thirty-year period found that during many of those years there was a “protesting
while black” effect—although admittedly the effect was not constant during the
entire period.76 It is important to note that study did not take into account protests
in the last three decades. Still, the study found that African American protests
are consistently more likely to draw police presence and vigilance than are white
protests.77 This is unsurprising considering that protesters of color are viewed
by police as threatening. Once police are present—in some of the years studied
although not all—police are then more likely to make arrests and use force and
violence against African American activists. 78 This “protesting while black”
effect was most salient in the years leading to the enactment of civil rights
legislation.79 I will engage in some speculation and hypothesize that police—as
state actors—engaged abusively with protesters of color prior to this legislation
because they perceived true challenges to the status quo that they were trained
to summarily quash. After all, police are trained to protect the existing
hierarchical boundaries within our society.80 To the degree that police again
perceive protests by activists of color as truly threatening current hierarchies and
the status quo, they may again react increasingly aggressively and violently to
these protests.
The increasing use of militarized strategies and easy access to military tools
and weapons multiplies the expanse and violence of police force. While
militarized strategies are not always used, they are most likely to be used when
law enforcement perceive protesters as dangerous.81 Militarization thus
intersects with protesters’ racial identity. Police’s use of military vehicles, water
75
See WOOD, supra note 13, at 41-42 (describing increase of SWAT teams throughout
United States, particularly at protests); see also Christian Davenport, Sarah A. Soule & David
A. Armstrong II, Protesting While Black? The Differential Policing of American Activism,
1960 to 1990, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 152, 168-69 (2011) (finding that predominantly African
American protests had higher likelihood of police presence and police action).
76
Davenport, Soule & Armstrong, supra note 75, at 169 (analogizing to “driving while
black” phenomenon).
77
Id. (theorizing that systematic racism causes state authorities to treat African American
protesters more aggressively so as to maintain status quo).
78
Id. at 166-68.
79
Id. at 168.
80
See CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER, POLICE POWER AND RACE RIOTS: URBAN UNREST IN PARIS
AND NEW YORK 255 (2014).
81
WOOD, supra note 13, at 41 (stating that specialized units used for predominantly black
protests were also used for armed standoffs or the “War on Drugs”).
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cannons, fire hoses, and special impact munitions against indigenous water
protectors in the Dundon lawsuit evidences a militarized police response.82 In a
prior article, I examined the police response to the pipeline protests and
Ferguson protests and accounted for how, particularly in Ferguson, military
police response was swift and unparalleled.83 People in Ferguson described
feeling that police were invading the neighborhood.84 Further, the eventual
discovery of communications between National Guard troops labeling Ferguson
protesters a hate group85 demonstrates that the classification of minority activists
as dangerous extended beyond the state police and local police. In contrast, the
police response to a white nationalist protest in Charlottesville over the removal
of a Confederate monument did not involve military vehicles, weapons, or
tactics.86 Observers criticized law enforcement for failing to police the protests.87
If police did not view the “Unite the Right” protesters as dangerous, they were
wrong. A white nationalist ran his car into a crowd, killing one counterprotester
and injuring several more.88 Another counterprotester was brutally beaten with
a metal pole and then arrested by police. 89
However, law enforcement’s fear of protesters of color is reinforced by the
federal government’s unwarranted historical and current preoccupation with
racial justice movements. Hearkening back to the 1950s and ‘60s, the FBI’s
targeting of African American activists is well documented in the agency’s own
records. Stolen and subsequently leaked FBI headquarter documents revealed
the persistent infiltration, surveillance, and harassment of groups termed “Black
Extremists” from 1956 to 1971.90 According to the FBI operation
82

Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2.
Pita Loor, supra note 62, at 26-29 (detailing use of SWAT teams, armored vehicles, and
military tactics in response to protests).
84
Id. at 27.
85
Barbara Starr & Wesley Bruer, Missouri National Guard’s Term for Ferguson
Protesters: ‘Enemy Forces,’ CNN (Apr. 17, 2015, 6:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04
/17/politics/missouri-national-guard-ferguson-protesters/index.html [https://perma.cc/94H5AW7A].
86
Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08.
87
Joe Heim et al., Charlottesville Protest Takes a Deadly Turn, WASH. POST, Aug. 13,
2017, at A14; see also HUNTON & WILLIAMS, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE
2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 126-27 (2017), https://www.hunton
ak.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5V7C-ZQRQ].
88
Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08; Heim et al., supra note 87, at A14.
89
Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08; see also Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith,
Charlottesville: Black Protester Deandre Harris ‘Beaten with Metal Poles’ by White
Supremacists, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2017, 4:48 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk
/news/world/americas/charlottesville-deandre-harris-black-protester-white-supremacistsbeat-metal-poles-neo-nazis-a7894916.html.
90
See FBI Records: The Vault, COINTELPRO: Black Extremist, FBI,
https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/cointel-pro-black-extremists [https://perma.cc/WTM983
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COINTELPRO, black extremists included Martin Luther King Jr. and
supporters as well as leaders of the Black Panther Party. 91 The now-unclassified
documents reveal multiple and serious FBI abuses, including that its agents
attempted to convince King to commit suicide by threatening to reveal evidence
of extramarital affairs gathered through illegal surveillance, and that they
infiltrated the Black Panther Party and used information learned to conduct a
raid of its leader Fred Hampton’s home, which resulted in his shooting and
death.92 COINTELPRO provided a clear and scary picture of a federal law
enforcement agency intent on watching and targeting movements seeking racial
justice and using the rhetoric of radicalization to justify its efforts. 93 After
COINTELPRO was exposed, the FBI terminated the operation in 1971.94
FBI focus on the activities of activists of color did not end with
COINTELPRO; the FBI’s monitoring of movements by people of color is alive
and well today. Data shows that from 2010 to 2019, the FBI has persistently
surveilled racial justice activists.95 A leaked 2017 FBI intelligence report
constructs, or perhaps revives, so-called “black extremists” as a terrorism
threat—now termed “Black Identity Extremist.”96 The report states that these
YJ3R] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter FBI Records: The Vault]; see also Allan M.
Jallon, A Break-In to End All Break-Ins, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at B13 (describing breakin of FBI office revealing documents detailing surveillance of black activist groups).
91
See BETTY MEDSGER, THE BURGLARY 342-48 (2014); Jallon, supra note 90, at B13; FBI
Records: The Vault, supra note 90.
92
Jallon, supra note 90, at B13 (describing illegal tape created and sent by FBI to King
urging him to commit suicide); see also MEDSGER, supra note 91, at 342-48 (stating that FBI
claimed credit for murdering Hampton in leaked internal documents); Ursula Wolfe-Rocca,
COINTELPRO: Teaching the FBI’s War on the Black Freedom Movement, RETHINKING
SCHOOLS, https://www.rethinkingschools.org/articles/cointelpro-teaching-the-fbi-s-war-onthe-black-freedom-movement [https://perma.cc/MJ9J-UGVD] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020)
(discussing FBI’s involvement in death of Black Panther Leader Fred Hampton).
93
Bryan Schatz, A Former FBI Whistleblower Explains Why the Federal Government Is
Failing on Domestic Terrorism—and How to Fix It, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/a-former-fbi-whistleblower-explains-whythe-federal-government-is-failing-on-domestic-terrorism-and-how-to-fix-it/
[https://perma.cc/K7Q7-Q9X3] (interviewing former FBI agent on his duties to infiltrate
groups deemed to be dangerous by FBI).
94
Jallon, supra note 90, at B13 (discussing leak of FBI documents as end of
COINTELPRO).
95
CHIP GIBBONS, DEFENDING RIGHTS & DISSENTS, STILL SPYING ON DISSENT: THE
ENDURING PROBLEM OF FBI FIRST AMENDMENT ABUSE 6-8 (2019), https://rightsand
dissent.org/fbi-spying/ [https://perma.cc/BU8Z-6WE7] (detailing FBI’s monitoring activity
of civil rights groups, such as By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”)).
96
COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FBI, (U//FOUO) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISTS LIKELY
MOTIVATED TO TARGET LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 2-4 (2017) [hereinafter FBI
COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT], https://privacysos.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FBIBlackIdentityExtremists.pdf [https://perma.cc/678E-G8EC] (reporting incidents of violence
against police officers as reason to watch “Black Identity Extremists” more closely); see also
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Black Identity Extremists are a threat to law enforcement because their mission
is to avenge the deaths of victims of police violence by killing officers. 97 The
FBI’s conclusion that this brand of terrorists exists is unfounded, dangerous, and
paranoid, with former federal agents asserting that the label simply stands for
“black people who scare [the FBI]”98 and that the classification simply allows
government surveillance of “basically anyone who is black and politically
active.”99 It conflates groups that protest racial injustice in various forms and
that predominantly have African Americans as members into one single
classification with a frightening goal. The FBI report lists six unconnected
instances of planned or executed civilian violence against police from 2014 to
2016 as proof of a manufactured sinister goal of various predominantly African
American groups.100 This is despite the fact that these assailants are best
described as lone actors.101 In a hearing before Congress in July 2019, the FBI
Director asserted that the agency was no longer investigating Black Identity
Extremists.102 However, additional documents that were leaked later suggest that
while the label may have changed, the investigative protocol remained and
included the Iron Fist Program with the goal of “proactively address[ing] this
priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced

Khaled A. Beydoun & Justin Hansford, Opinion, The F.B.I.’s Dangerous Crackdown on
‘Black Identity Extremists,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/11/15/opinion/black-identity-extremism-fbi-trump.html
(analyzing history of
COINTELPRO in connection with FBI decision to create label of “Black Identity
Extremists”); Miriam Zoila Pérez, What Does the FBI’s New ‘Black Identity Extremist’ Label
Really Mean to Black Organizing, COLORLINES (Oct. 25, 2017, 12:26 PM),
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/what-does-fbis-new-black-identity-extremist-labelreally-mean-black-organizing [https://perma.cc/9ALL-C72L] (comparing FBI’s “Black
Identity Extremist” label to COINTELPRO operations in 1960s).
97
FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 2 (“The FBI assesses it is very likely
Black Identity Extremist (BIE) perceptions of police brutality against African Americans
spurred an increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement and
will very likely serve as justification for such violence.” (footnotes omitted)).
98
Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 96.
99
Kate Irby, Protesters Are Increasingly Being Labeled Domestic Terrorist Threats,
Experts Worry, IMPACT2020 (Oct 27, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news
/nation-world/national/article181358311.html [https://perma.cc/R66Y-KP5W].
100
FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 4-6; see also GIBBONS, supra note
95, at 7-11 (detailing FBI’s sometimes violent responses to those labeled BIEs).
101
See FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 4-6 (finding no connection
between attackers and any racial justice groups); Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 96 (“[The
FBI Report] links incidents of violence by a handful of individual citizens . . . to ‘B.I.E.
ideology . . . .’”).
102
Byron Tau, FBI Abandons Use of Term ‘Black Identity Extremism,’ WALL STREET J.
(July 23, 2019, 10:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-abandons-use-of-terms-blackidentity-extremism-11563921355 (“We only investigate violence. We don’t investigate
extremism. We don’t investigate ideology.”).
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intelligence collection efforts.”103 The facts should lead the FBI to concentrate
its intelligence efforts elsewhere. The data show that when police need
protection, it is from white extremists—not activists of color. Between 2001 and
2017, of the forty-five police officers tragically killed by domestic extremists,
thirty-four were killed by right-wing white extremists. 104 A 2009 Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) report noted the dangerous rise of this trend and
warned of right-wing extremism.105 While this report was harshly criticized by
conservative politicians and subsequently disavowed by then-DHS Secretary
Janet Napolitano, its predictions have come to fruition in the form of multiple
deadly attacks not only on police but also on civilians by white nationalists and
so-called “sovereign citizens” who oppose any government authority. 106
African Americans are not the only minority targets of federal law
enforcement surveillance. In 2018, the ACLU obtained government documents
suggesting that police were being trained with counterterrorism strategies to
police indigenous protests of the Keystone pipeline.107 The same documents link

103
Patrick G. Eddington, Constitution Day 2019: The Hidden Domestic Surveillance
Crisis, CATO INST. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary
/constitution-day-2019-hidden-domestic-surveillance-crisis [https://perma.cc/6UJE-3TFV];
Ken Klippenstein, FBI’s Document: Iron Fist Focuses on ‘Black Identity Extremist’
Movement, POPULARRESISTANCE.ORG (Aug. 24, 2019), https://popularresistance.org/fbisdocument-iron-fist-focuses-on-black-identity-extremist-movement/ [https://perma.cc/3CLYNQA8]; see also Letter from MediaJustice to Elijah Cummings, Chairman, U.S. House
Oversight & Reform Comm., Jerry Nadler, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Comm., &
Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, U.S. House Homeland Sec. Comm. (Sept 17, 2019),
https://mediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ProtectBlackDissent-Response-Letter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9V-RP5Y] (citing leaked documents in urging House to take
action against FBI’s ongoing use of BIE label under different term).
104
J. Oliver Conroy, They Hate the US Government, and They’re Multiplying: The
Terrifying Rise of ‘Sovereign Citizens,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/sovereign-citizens-rightwing-terrorismhate-us-government [https://perma.cc/3MH2-97WQ].
105
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IA-0257-09,
(U//FOUO) RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING
RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 1, 3, 8 (2009), https://fas.org/irp
/eprint/rightwing.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4BT-9TK4].
106
Conroy, supra note 104.
107
Will Parrish & Sam Levin, ‘Treating Protest as Terrorism’: US Plans Crackdown on
Keystone XL Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/environment/2018/sep/20/keystone-pipeline-protest-activism-crackdownstanding-rock [https://perma.cc/BDJ5-5G97] (referencing training on mass-arrest protocol,
riot-control formations, and crowd-control procedures); see also Sam Levin, Revealed: FBI
Terrorism Taskforce Investigating Standing Rock Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017,
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/10/standing-rock-fbiinvestigation-dakota-access [https://perma.cc/Z7J6-LWXN] (detailing similar techniques
used against Standing Rock activists).
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DAPL indigenous water protectors to “environmental rights extremists.” 108 As
a matter of fact, an FBI antiterrorism task force worked with police to investigate
opponents of the DAPL.109 Notably, in 2004 and 2005, the FBI considered
environmental extremists the number one “domestic terrorism threat” despite
the fact that there were no deaths associated with environmentalist actors. 110 Just
like the “black extremist” label, that of “environmental extremist” justifies
government surveillance, government interference, and ultimately government
violence to suppress protest activity of indigenous activists.111 Within the last
decade, the FBI has engaged in persistent investigation of environmentalists, just
as it has of racial justice activists.112 Either coincidentally or by design, this
results in the targeting of indigenous activists whose interests intersect with
environmental justice. During this time of intense FBI focus on black and
environmental activists, the FBI has dropped the category of white supremacist
violence as a basis for investigation, making it increasingly difficult to assess
the threat of white supremacy and the extent of government efforts to investigate
it.113
Sadly, like law enforcement, white civilians have also historically viewed
activists of color negatively—and still currently do. In the ‘60s, whites were
likely to view civil rights protests as violent and harmful, while African
Americans saw them as peaceful and productive.114 In 1966, 85% of whites
polled thought that demonstrations by African Americans hurt the movement for
civil rights, while a 1969 survey found that 70% of Blacks believed the

108
See OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FIELD
ANALYSIS REPORT: (U//FOUO) TTPS USED IN RECENT US PIPELINE ATTACKS BY SUSPECTED
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS 2 (2017); see also Alleen Brown, The Green Scare:
How a Movement That Never Killed Anyone Became the FBI’s No. 1 Domestic Terrorism
Threat, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23
/ecoterrorism-fbi-animal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/3YAH-VA5W] (detailing Homeland
Security’s shift to focusing on environmental rights activists as potential terrorist threats).
109
Levin, supra note 107 (reciting accounts of three individuals approached by FBI due to
their connection with Standing Rock water protector movement).
110
Irby, supra note 99.
111
See id. (finding that such surveillance could lead to asset seizure without a hearing);
see also Parrish & Levin, supra note 107 (noting Keystone Pipeline activists’ preparation for
police violence during peaceful protest).
112
GIBBONS, supra note 95, at 6-12 (analyzing FBI activity in connection with racial
justice protests and environmental protests).
113
Sandra Fulton, Opinion, FBI Must Come Clean on Targeting Racial-Justice Activists
Before Sweeping Surveillance Powers Are Renewed, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/461822-fbi-must-come-clean-ontargeting-racial-justice-activists [https://perma.cc/RN34-JSRE] (“[T]he bureau has dropped
white-supremacist violence as a category at a time when hate crimes targeting communities
of color are on the rise.”).
114
Mora A. Reinka & Colin Wayne Leach, Race and Reaction: Divergent Views of Police
Violence and Protest Against, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 768, 774 (2017).
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demonstrations helped.115 Despite the passage of time and at least theoretical
progress in racial relations, views on protests still differ by racial lines.
Statistically, whites’ views of protests vary based on the purported race of the
protesters. Thus, 67% of whites see protests as useful in achieving social change,
unless protesters are characterized as black, in which case the number drops to
45%.116 Whites are also more likely to justify violence perpetrated by police
during protests. Only 33% of whites believed police violence in the Ferguson
protests was unjustified, while 65% of African Americans found it unjustified.117
Yet whites are less forgiving of violence by protesters in predominantly black
protests. For example, 68% of whites thought activists who acted aggressively
during protests of the police killing of Freddie Gray were “opportunistic
criminals,” while 55% of African Americans saw violent acts by protesters as
caused by “legitimate outrage.”118
III. PROTEST CASES AS A SOURCE OF INQUIRY FOR
CRITICAL RACE THEORISTS
Knowing that protests are no different than regular street encounters in that
people of color are more likely to experience police violence, the doctrinal
impediments that aggregate to facilitate police abuse of protesters should
concern critical race theorists. The Fourth Amendment sets particular
impediments in the emblematic protest scenario, where police use force to
disperse instead of detain activists. As a threshold matter, courts may find that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply where police were using force not to
arrest but to disperse activists. This ends the possibility of any Fourth
Amendment redress.119 Even if a court finds that the Fourth Amendment does
apply, the court may utilize a collective lens in mass protests and evaluate the
constitutionality of an officer’s conduct in light of the conduct of the crowd
instead of the conduct of the individual plaintiff. This approach is contrary to
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and dilutes any protection the Fourth

115

Elahe Izadi, Black Lives Matter and America’s Long History of Resisting Civil Rights
Protesters, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Apr. 19, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/19/black-lives-matters-and-americas-long-history-ofresisting-civil-rights-protesters/.
116
Reinka & Leach, supra note 114, at 774.
117
Id. (discussing 2014 Pew poll that highlighted this difference in opinion).
118
Id. (citation omitted).
119
When the Court finds that the Fourth Amendment does not apply, it often finds that
there was no due process violation either because that requires the plaintiff to meet the high
burden of showing that the police conduct “shocks the conscience.” See Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (describing unconstitutional police conduct under due process
clause as “egregious” or “conscience shocking”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis ex rel.
Estate of Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (“To this end, for half a century now we have
spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the
conscience.”).
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Amendment provides. Returning to the pipeline protests, the district court’s first
ruling in Dundon v. Kirchmeier—denying the plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin police
from using less-than-lethal weapons and water hoses to confront water
protectors120—demonstrates how the Fourth Amendment can fail activists of
color in dispersal cases.
A.

Due to Troubling Developments in Court Doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment Arguably Does Not Apply in the Emblematic Protest Scenario
Where Police Use Force to Disperse Protesters

In his Fourth Amendment analysis of the excessive-force claim in Dundon,
Chief Judge Daniel Hovland reasoned that the Fourth Amendment may not even
apply because activists were never arrested or affirmatively detained by
police.121 This argument was advanced by the defendants in their Motion to
Dismiss, where they relied on Fourth Amendment precedent to argue that
because the police did not intend to detain the water protectors, they were never
seized and thus the Fourth Amendment could not even apply. 122 This is because
the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D.123 concluded that a person is
seized either when being physically touched by police or when submitting to
state authority.124
The Supreme Court greatly limited Fourth Amendment protection when it
defined a seizure narrowly in Hodari D. Hodari D. argued that the Fourth
Amendment protected him when he saw police chasing him and knew that he
was not free to leave.125 However, the majority—via Justice Scalia—engaged in
a literal analysis stating that “[t]the word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of
a laying on of hands or application of physical force.” 126 Post-Hodari D., the
Fourth Amendment does not apply unless a police officer physically touches the
individual or the individual submits to a government show of authority. 127 In his
120

Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *20 (D.N.D. Feb. 7,
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (“[T]he Court finds no reasonable
juror could conclude the level of non-lethal force used by law enforcement officers during the
chaos on November 20, 2016, at the Backwater Bridge was objectively unreasonable.”).
121
Id.
122
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Kyle Kirchmeier et al. Motion to
Dismiss at 39, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406 (D.N.D. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL
3071655 [hereinafter Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (“The Supreme Court
subsequently clarified the termination or restraint upon a person’s freedom of movement must
be through ‘means intentionally applied’ to constitute a ‘seizure’—an unintentional act cannot
result in a seizure.” (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007))).
123
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
124
Id. at 627-28; see also Renée Paradis, Note, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a BrightLine Rule Governing Seizure in Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 316, 318 (2003).
125
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28.
126
Id. at 626.
127
Id.
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dissent, Justice Stevens—joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall—criticized this
narrowing as inconsistent with the goal of deterring police misconduct because
it determined whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the interaction based
on how the civilian responded, not on how the police behaved.128 Unless the
person gives into police force, there is no literal seizure. It does not matter if the
show of force is unwarranted, violent, or unsupported by probable cause. The
dissent focused on how this limiting of the seizure—and, therefore, of the
application of the Fourth Amendment—ignores the “coercive and intimidating”
effects of police conduct.129 Justice Stevens worried that “[i]t [was] too early to
know the consequences of [Hodari D.’s] holding. If carried to its logical
conclusion, it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten
countless innocent citizens into surrendering whatever privacy rights they may
still have.”130
Fast forwarding from Hodari D. to Dundon, Chief Judge Hovland reasoned
that since there was no physical laying of hands (and no arrests), the water
protectors were not seized and the Fourth Amendment did not apply at all to any
of the police conduct.131 According to the judge, the water protectors could have
just complied with police orders to disperse.132 This conclusion ignored the
plaintiffs’ reports that some were “locked in by [tear] gas, and also blinded and
gagging,” decked to the ground by the force of the water, and that about two
hundred were physically injured.133 Moreover, as mentioned in prior discussion,
the Graham Court defined a seizure as some sort of restraint on personal liberty
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.134 Further and consistent with the Hodari D. dissent,
doing away with Fourth Amendment concerns simply by concluding that there
was no seizure completely discounts how the police behaved in the
confrontation. This limiting of Fourth Amendment protection fails to deter
police violence and militaristic responses to activists. In Dundon, this limitation
allowed the district judge’s easy denial of the injunction, thereby permitting law
enforcement to continue this manner of assault on water protectors, which
included blasting them for hours with water cannons, tear gas, concussion and
other grenades, rubber bullets, and bean bag projectiles.135 A more protective
Fourth Amendment analysis would not necessitate a literal seizure but would

128
Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule
focus on the conduct of law enforcement officers and on discouraging improper behavior on
their part, and not on the reaction of the citizen to the show of force.” (footnote omitted)).
129
Id. at 645-46.
130
Id. at 646-47.
131
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (D.N.D. Feb. 7,
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam).
132
Id.
133
Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted); Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
134
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
135
See Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *3 (listing various responses of law enforcement to
protests).
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instead exalt the liberty rationale of the Fourth Amendment. As the dissent in
Hodari D. stated, Terry expanded the ambit of Fourth Amendment seizures to
interactions that did not amount to arrests—to “restraint[s] of an individual’s
personal liberty ‘in some way.’”136 In Dundon, police intruded not only on the
water protectors’ right to be left alone but importantly also on their right to
protest, object to, and dissent from the construction of DAPL. Thus, the court
should have exalted the water protectors’ liberty interests instead of discounting
them because they had not been arrested or told that they could not leave.137 The
proper balance may be that where the liberty interest involves First Amendment
conduct, the court must more scrupulously examine the government’s
intrusion.138 In other words, where law enforcement seeks to police or regulate
expression—not criminal conduct—the Graham reasonableness test must be
adapted to protect the expressive conduct.
Other courts are divided regarding how the Fourth Amendment applies to
dispersal cases.139 A court could just assume that the police conduct implicates
the Fourth Amendment. This was the district judge’s approach in Lamb v. City
of Decatur,140 where police used pepper spray against a group of protesters.141
However, it is unclear from the opinion whether the defendants made the
argument that there was no seizure. In Marbet v. City of Portland,142 the City
and the police officers contended that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
their use of pepper spray and rubber bullets or to their act of physically moving
activists who were protesting the Bush presidency.143 The factual narrative
suggests that the plaintiffs were not arrested.144 The court disagreed with the
defendants and had no problem finding that a seizure occurs when police use
“physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately
unsuccessful.”145 The Marbet judge found that the attempt to control the
activists’ movement was determinative of the case’s outcome. 146
136

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
137
See Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (“Plaintiffs have neither alleged they were
arrested or detained by law enforcement officials . . . nor alleged they were informed by law
enforcement officers they were not free to leave and walk away.”).
138
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (“Where the materials sought
to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485 (1965))).
139
See Paradis, supra note 124, at 334-41 (describing uncertainties that exist in Fourth
Amendment case law regarding public protests and dispersal).
140
947 F. Supp. 1261 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
141
Id. at 1263.
142
No. 1:02-cv-01448, 2003 WL 23540258 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2003).
143
Id. at *10.
144
Id. at *1.
145
Id. at *10.
146
Id.
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This focus on the police conduct is useful when at least part of the objective
is to deter police violence. In Quraishi v. St. Charles County,147 the district court
again focused on the actions of law enforcement, ruling that journalists in the
streets of Ferguson reporting on the police shooting of Michael Brown were
seized when the police sprayed them with tear gas.148 The judge stated that
“[f]iring tear gas, pepper spray, or other chemical agents at someone can
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”149 In direct contrast, in the
case of Ellsworth v. City of Lansing,150 the judge did not engage in any Fourth
Amendment analysis when police teargassed protesters. In support of this
conclusion, the judge cited County of Sacramento v. Lewis151 and stated
parenthetically, without any further discussion, that “where no seizure occurs,
[a] claim of excessive force is analyzed under the substantive due process
standard, rather than [the] Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.”152
Likewise, in a lawsuit surrounding a protest of the police involved in the killing
of Eric Garner, the judge concluded that law enforcement’s use of long-range
acoustic devices (“LRADs”) against activists did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.153 The judge stated that “[a]n officer’s request to leave an area,
even with use of force, is not a seizure unless ‘accompanied by the use of
sufficient force intentionally to restrain a person and gain control of his
movements.’”154
Also, another district court stated that, when assessing whether to evaluate the
police conduct pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a court may differentiate
between protesters depending on where each was situated and make judgments
regarding who was able to escape the scene and who was essentially captured

147

No. 4:16-cv-01320, 2019 WL 2423321 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2019), appeal docketed, No.
19-2462 (8th Cir. July 12, 2019).
148
Id. at *8-9.
149
Id. at *9 (citation omitted).
150
34 F. Supp. 2d 571 (W.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1340 (2000).
151
523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1986).
152
Ellsworth, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 580-81 (concluding that police conduct did not shock
conscience and therefore did not violate due process).
153
Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d sub nom.
Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018).
154
Id. (quoting Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2015)). Interestingly,
however, the Second Circuit subsequently held that even though the Fourth Amendment did
not apply, the plaintiffs had asserted a sufficient substantive due process claim for excessive
force. Maguire, 892 F.3d at 529 (“[W]e hold that purposefully using a LRAD in a manner
capable of causing serious injury to move non-violent protesters to the sidewalks violates the
Fourteenth Amendment under clearly established law.”). The Second Circuit based this
conclusion on what the court perceived as a new articulation of due process excessive-force
claims that essentially uses the same tests for excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See id. at 534-38.
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by chemical agents.155 This type of plaintiff-by-plaintiff analysis is not helpful
in terms of regulating police conduct or in terms of decreasing the likelihood of
the aggressive use of chemical agents by law enforcement when responding to
protesters. Again, this is because such analysis defines whether the Fourth
Amendment offers protection based on how the police aggression affected the
victims and not based on whether the conduct was wrongful and excessive in the
first place.
Thus, for some courts, the Supreme Court precedent defining seizure has
arguably removed Fourth Amendment protections from the typical protest
scenario, in which law enforcement use militaristic force and military grade
weapons to disperse protesters.156 Section 1983, by its own language, is a tool to
“redress” violations of individual’s constitutional rights by any person acting on
behalf of the government.157 A literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
seizure language in the context of dispersal cases therefore violates the remedial
purposes of the Act. The vehicle that the Court has determined will vindicate
victims’ rights is arguably not available in a swath of protest cases. 158
B.

Protesters as Unit

Even when a court finds that the Fourth Amendment applies to the police
conduct, the court may use a distorted lens to assess civilian behavior that unduly
amplifies the threat protesters pose to officer and public safety. Because the
Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis involves balancing to assess
“reasonableness,” a miscalculation of protesters’ conduct leads to a
miscalculation of the degree of police force that is reasonable.
The question in excessive-force cases is theoretically a balancing between the
conduct of the target and the response of police. The court engages in this
155

Buck v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:04-cv-01000, 2007 WL 9734037, at *30-32
(D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2007) (stating that seizure “depend[s] on a Plaintiff’s location” and whether
“a reasonable person could have concluded that he or she was not free to leave the area or
otherwise terminate the encounter,” while considering seizure by chemical agents and
physical contact separately).
156
See Pita Loor, supra note 62, at 26-27; see also Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam); WOOD, supra note 13, at 41-42.
157
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
158
The Dundon defendants also reasoned that any Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim would be more challenging for plaintiffs because the requirement that conduct “shock
the conscience” is a more burdensome standard than an “objective reasonableness” analysis.
Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 51. Although the language of both
the due process test and the Fourth Amendment test would suggest that this is a reasonable
inference, there might not be an actual difference in terms of plaintiffs’ likelihood of success
because both constitutional provisions require a showing of bad motive. See Brown, supra
note 56, at 1274 (“Whether analyzing the use of force under the fourth amendment or the
fourteenth, most courts find a constitutional violation only when the defendants have acted
unreasonably and with improper motivation.”).

2020]

BRUTALITY IN PROTEST POLICING

843

balancing by evaluating: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether there is an
immediate threat, and (3) whether the target is resisting arrest or trying to flee. 159
As discussed in Part I, Graham’s permissive language about the “split-second
decisions” police must make provides too much deference to aggression by law
enforcement.160 This deference sets a low bar for police aggression because
judges attribute mistakes in police judgments to “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving” circumstances.161 In the protest scenario, courts further compound the
assessment of the threat that police face by weighing the actions of the crowd of
protesters in conjunction with the actions of the individual plaintiff-protesters.
This is contrary to traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which inquires
whether the government intrusion is reasonable in light of the individual’s
actions—not the actions of those in proximity or even of his associates. 162 Just
like a police officer should not be able to arrest someone in proximity to a
lawbreaker, the officer should not be able to use force against someone in
proximity to a lawbreaker. After all, police are permitted to use force as justified
by their official duties—not because they have some natural right to use force
against the general public. If the court considers the actions of the crowd as a
unit versus the actions of an individual plaintiff-protester, then the threat
calculus is off balance and the court will justify what would otherwise be
unconstitutional police violence.
The Dundon defendants advocated for this mode of analysis before the district
court. Even though there was no allegation that the Dundon plaintiffs were
anything other than peaceful, the defendants argued that police force was
reasonable because the plaintiffs were part of a unit that was behaving
unlawfully. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants stated that the plaintiffs
“were intermingled [with others who] were engaged in removing and attempting
to remove government property from Law Enforcement’s barricade prior to
force allegedly being applied to them. The only reasonable inference is [that] the
unlawful conduct of the protesters . . . motivated Law Enforcement’s alleged use

159

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Because ‘[t]he test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application,’ . . . its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (first alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979))).
160
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (arguing that such a permissive standard
effectively immunizes large swath of aggressive police conduct).
161
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
162
See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
cause to search that person. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a
person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

844

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:817

of force.”163 The defendants further cited Carr v. District of Columbia164 for the
proposition that a “requirement that the officers verify that each and every
member of a crowd engaged in a specific riotous act would be practically
impossible in any situation involving a large riot.”165 Thus, the defendants
argued that the use of force was reasonable to control the crowd or unit rather
than to control the plaintiffs specifically. 166
The Dundon defendants’ reference to Carr is significant because the concept
of unit probable cause was initially adopted by the court in that case.167 In that
case, the D.C. District Court had ruled that the plaintiff protesters’ arrests
violated the Fourth Amendment because the police could not establish that each
of the people they arrested was engaged in the crime of rioting.168 The D.C.
Circuit reversed, holding that the police need only show a “reasonable belief that
the entire crowd is acting as a unit and therefore all members of the crowd
violated the law.”169 The D.C. Circuit accepted the risk that an innocent protester
could be swept up in the arrest highlighting that the question was one of probable
cause, not final conviction.170 However, this language minimizes how far of a
departure this type of group analysis is from the probable cause requirement of
individualized suspicion. In the protest scenario, it also ignores how this group
analysis harms activists’ right to express dissent—thus undervaluing protest
activity. This concept of unit probable cause espouses guilt by association and
thus dilutes the Fourth Amendment beyond recognition. The rights of activists
who participate in mass protests are in particular danger in jurisdictions that
adopt this group analysis.
Returning to Dundon, the district judge referenced the “chaotic scenario”171
and the “sizeable minority of protesters . . . [whom he] categorized as a group of
unlawful and violent agitators” when he denied the injunction.172 The judge
ruled that if the Fourth Amendment applied, no reasonable juror could find that

163

Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 2.
587 F.3d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
165
Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 27 (quoting Bernini v. City
of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012)).
166
Id. at 28-32; id. at 31 (“Regardless, Bernini establishes the use of non-lethal munitions
upon an unruly crowd, which officers reasonably believe is acting as a unit, to prevent the
crowds unlawful access to property and to restore order, is objectively reasonable as a matter
of law.”).
167
Id. at 27-28 (citing Bernini, 665 F.3d at 1003).
168
Carr, 587 F.3d at 405-06.
169
Id. at 408.
170
Id. (“Probable cause only requires a reasonable belief of guilt, not a certitude.” (citing
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))).
171
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *19 (D.N.D. Feb. 7,
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam).
172
Id. at *8.
164
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the force was unreasonable.173 The judge focused on the overall scene and
volatility of the crowd—instead of the specific acts of the plaintiffs—suggesting
that he was persuaded by the defendants’ reference to Carr and to a group/unit
analysis.
Since Carr was decided in 2009, various jurisdictions have progressively
embraced this Fourth Amendment unit analysis in protest cases. The Dundon
defendants were well situated because the Eighth Circuit had already adopted
group probable cause in Bernini v. City of St. Paul.174 In Bernini, the court found
that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when arresting a large group
of protesters at the Republican National Convention, even though the officers
were unable to articulate probable cause for each person arrested. Citing Carr,
the court determined that
[w]hat is reasonable in the context of a potential large-scale urban riot may
be different from what is reasonable in the relative calm of a tavern with a
dozen patrons. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officers
have grounds to believe all arrested persons were a part of the unit observed
violating the law.”175
In another Eighth Circuit case, the court applied group probable cause to
Ferguson protesters.176 The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ arrests for failure
to disperse were reasonable because they “chose not to disassociate” themselves
from the group throwing debris at police and instead continued to walk while
“in the vicinity of a violent crowd” toward the line of police shooting rubber
bullets at them.177 Thus, the proximity of the plaintiffs to an unlawful crowd
justified the police’s violent conduct.
As an example of the growing acceptance of this looser, group probable cause
standard for protests, courts within the Second Circuit—courts that previously
rejected group probable cause—are increasingly embracing it for mass protests.
In a pre-Carr decision, the Second Circuit ruled in Papineau v. Parmley178 that
police violated the Fourth Amendment when they beat and violently arrested
indigenous protesters indiscriminately. 179 Because the police admitted that they
could not identify whether any of the plaintiffs were actually blocking the
roadway—which was necessary for a disorderly conduct arrest—the court ruled
173

Id. at *19.
665 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (considering mass arrests of
approximately one hundred protesters surrounding Republican National Convention).
175
Id. at 1003 (quoting Carr, 587 F.3d at 407).
176
White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 2017) (considering claims by six sets
of plaintiffs arrested during protest).
177
Id. at 1075-79.
178
465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006).
179
Id. at 53 (describing violent police action including “beating [protesters] with their riot
batons, dragging them by their hair and kicking them,” choking a praying man, manhandling
both an eleven-year-old girl and an elderly medicine woman, and “even toss[ing] an infant in
a double leg cast from his stroller”).
174
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that the police could not have reasonably believed that the mass arrest was
justified because a few protesters had violated the law.180 The court further
articulated how a rule that would permit the unlawful actions of some to be
attributed to the whole group would affect the First Amendment in that “we see
little that would prevent the police from ending a demonstration without notice
for the slightest transgression by a single protester.”181
Post-Carr, in Dinler v. City of New York,182 the defendants cited group
probable cause pursuant to Carr, arguing that police could arrest the entire group
“where it reasonably appears to the police that a large group is engaging in
unlawful conduct.”183 A judge in New York’s Southern District, citing the
principle of individualized probable cause espoused in Ybarra v. Illinois,184
rejected the defendants’ arguments that they possessed probable cause to arrest
Republican National Convention protesters for obstruction of traffic and defying
a police order to disperse.185 However, the judge did not specifically reject
Carr’s reasoning, stating that Carr did not really promulgate a new probable
cause standard but instead “stand[s] for the unremarkable proposition that,
where a group of individuals is acting in concert such that a reasonable officer
could conclude that every member of the group violated the law, that officer
would be justified in arresting every member of the group.”186 Calling the Carr
proposition “unremarkable” in the realm of probable cause is a
mischaracterization because it deviates from individualized suspicion.
The same year and in the same district, in Garcia v. Bloomberg,187 another
judge rejected the defendants’ arguments to treat seven hundred Occupy Wall
Street marchers as a group because even if not all protesters heard the police
warnings to avoid the street, some did, and law enforcement could then arrest all
of them for disorderly conduct pursuant to Carr.188 The district judge
distinguished Carr by differentiating between violent rioters and peaceful
protesters.189 However, the Second Circuit sitting en banc reversed without
mentioning Carr, instead highlighting the “confused and boisterous situation
confronting the officers” and noting that some protesters were able to hear the

180

Id. at 59.
Id. at 57.
182
No. 1:04-cv-07921, 2012 WL 4513352 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012).
183
Id. at *4 (quoting Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment to Dismiss the False Arrest Claims of Plaintiffs Arrested on East 16th
Street at 9, Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352 (No. 1:04-cv-07921)).
184
444 U.S. 85 (1979).
185
Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352, at *5.
186
Id.
187
865 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Garcia v. Does, 764 F.3d 170 (2d
Cir. 2013), rev’d en banc, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
188
Id. at 489-90 (finding that protesters were nonviolent and therefore did not receive fair
warning prior to their arrest).
189
Id.
181
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police warning yet made no attempts to disperse.190 This was sufficient for the
Second Circuit to conclude that there was probable cause to arrest all protesters
for disorderly conduct.191 While the Second Circuit did not allude to group
probable cause in Garcia, the ruling that failure of some protesters to heed police
orders was sufficient to result in the arrest of seven hundred individuals
demonstrates that the court allowed the actions of some activists to be attributed
to the entire group.
This looser probable cause standard means that police can easily justify the
indiscriminate use of violent tactics and less-than-lethal weapons when they
assert that violent protesters were in the vicinity. This standard substantially
deviates from and is inconsistent with traditional individualized determinations
of suspicion.
CONCLUSION
Police officers’ targeting of protesters of color is unlikely to end considering
that it dates back to the beginning of the American republic. Whether quelling
slave rebellions,192 cracking down on a Mexican American rally against Chicano
casualties in the Vietnam War,193 or suppressing civil rights marchers in
Selma,194 government authorities have consistently responded brutally to dissent
from people of color. When nonwhite activists challenge the status quo, law
enforcement reacts with military-grade force to quash protests. Protesters of
color have few allies because the white majority—which benefits from the status
quo—sees these protest movements as generally corrosive to society and to
progress.195 The courts are not allies either. Instead, harmful Fourth Amendment
doctrines coalesce to facilitate police abuse of activists of color.
This Essay demonstrates how the Fourth Amendment fails to provide
protection in the emblematic protest scenario, in which law enforcement
employs brutal and often militaristic force to disperse protesters.
Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment also fails its own roots, deviating from
the principle of individualized suspicion in favor of group suspicion. This
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analysis suggests that courts should recalibrate their treatment of policeexcessive-force claims in mass protest cases in order to reign in law enforcement
abuse and to be more protective of activists’ rights to dissent. An alternative
analysis should elevate protest rights and apply a more rigorous Fourth
Amendment review when the police seek to control expressive conduct.

